is widely deployed to monitor, control, and configure network elements. Even though the SNMP technology is well documented and understood, it remains relatively unclear how SNMP is used in practice and what the typical SNMP usage patterns are. This paper discusses how to perform large-scale SNMP traffic measurements in order to develop a better understanding of how SNMP is used in production networks. The tools described in this paper have been applied to networks ranging from large national research networks to relatively small faculty networks. The goal of the research is to provide feedback to SNMP protocol developers within the IETF, researchers working within the context of the IRTF-NMRG, as well as other researchers interested in network management in general. We believe that the results are also valuable for operators and vendors who want to optimize their management interactions or understand the traffic generated by their management software.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) was introduced in the late 1980s [1] and has since then evolved to what is known today as the SNMP version 3 framework (SNMPv3) [2] . While SNMP is widely deployed, it is not clear which features are being used, how SNMP usage differs in different types of networks or organizations, which information is frequently queried, and what typical SNMP interaction patterns are in real world production networks.
There have been several publications in the recent past dealing with the performance of SNMP in general [3] , the impact of SNMPv3 security [4] , [5] , or the relative performance of SNMP compared to Web Services [6] - [8] . While these papers are generally useful to better understand the impact of various design decisions and technologies some of these papers lack a strong foundation because authors typically assume certain SNMP interaction patterns without having experimental evidence that the assumptions are correct.
In fact, there are many speculations on how SNMP is being used in real world production networks and how it performs, but no systematic measurements have been performed and published so far.
Many authors use the i f Tab 1 e of the I F -M I B [9] or the tcpConnTable of the TCP-MIB [10] as a starting point for their analysis and comparison. Despite the fact that there is no evidence that operations on these tables dominate SNMP traffic, it is unclear how these tables are read and if any optimizations are done by deployed management applications. It is also unclear what the actual traffic trade-off between periodic polling and more aperiodic data retrieval is. Furthermore, we do not generally understand how much traffic is devoted to standardized MIB objects and how much traffic deals with proprietary MIB objects and whether the operation mix differs between these object classes or between different operational environments.
This paper describes an effort to collect SNMP traffic traces in order to find answers to some of these questions. Section II discusses possible approaches to collect traces and Section III describes the tools that have been developed to analyze such traces. Section IV discusses the locations from which traces have already been collected. Section V provides some initial results of our analysis, it should be noted that our research is still in progress and more detailed results will be published in a forthcoming paper. Section VI discusses related work and conclusions are finally provided in Section VII.
II. APPROACHES
The collection of SNMP traffic traces requires the support of network operators. On the technical side, good capturing points have to be defined and configured. On the non-technical side, an agreement has to be defined under which data can be shared and results published.
It is usually difficult to make traces with complete SNMP messages openly available since they contain sensitive information. In some cases, we have settled on agreements, which made data available to specific researchers for research purposes while in other cases the operators involved kept the data and instead ran our analysis software and provided the aggregated results back to us A. Sharing Traces In the first approach, an operator collects traces and subsequently makes them available to researchers for further 1-4244-0799-0/07/$25.00 t2007 IEEEprocessing. Since traces contain data of different levels of sensitivity, operators typically want to exercise some control over the data that is given to researchers. Good examples are SNMP community strings, which are often used as cleartext passwords and hence should be removed. Since removing such data in binary pcap files which contain BER encoded SNMP messages is technically non-trivial and also difficult to verify, there is a need for a human and machine readable representation which makes it easier to (a) identify data to be removed, (b) to actually remove the identified sensitive data, and (c) to verify that the removal was successful.
Next to the filtering of highly sensitive data, some operators also prefer to have data anonymized so that the risk of leaking sensitive information is reduced. Even though strong anonymization is difficult to achieve, it is still often considered useful to achieve at least a level of pseudonymization as a second safety measure to complement a non-disclosure agreement. Anonymization requires applying a filter-in principle where only data for which an appropriate anonymization function exists is retained in a trace. Thus, anonymization can reduce the usefulness of the traces for researchers and it therefore requires some careful planning on the side of the operator involved. Furthermore, the development of suitable anonymization functions is still an ongoing research topic and hence the required software tools are experimental and changing rapidly.
B. Sharing Analysis Software
The alternative approach to sharing traces is to share the analysis software and to ask operators who own the traces to execute the analysis software on behalf of researchers. Of course, operators who execute analysis software provided by researchers have to trust the software and check the results against their privacy requirements. As a consequence, analysis software should be open, portable, and reasonably well documented. Analysis software should be provided in a way, which makes it possible for operators to verify that the code does not contain any unwanted features. This also implies a pragmatic selection of programming languages so that programs are likely to be understood by the operator community.
Experielnce so far tells us that a combiniation of both approaches usually works reasonably well. In such cases a researcher obtains potentially filtered and anonymized traces from an operator (typically legally covered by an agreement between the operator and the trace analyst) and the researcher executes analysis software provided by other researchers interested in the trace (assuming that is covered by the agreement).
C. Intermediate Formats
To support the above mentioned approaches, two intermediate formats for SNMP traces have been developed [11] The first one is an XML format which is intended as a human and machine readable exchange format which is capable to retain all information found in BER encoded SNMP messages. This format is relatively verbose (traces in XML format are typically a factor 7 larger than the original pcap trace file), but this can be mitigated by compression. A large number of tools do exist to process XML files and so ad-hoc transformations are feasible. However, our experience is that many XML tools do not scale very well to large data sets.
The second intermediate format is a simple CSV (comma separated values) format, which only retains the most essential information. It turns out that processing CSV files is usually much faster, especially since many line-oriented tools can be applied directly. The downside of the CSV format is that it is not very flexible and changes in the CSV Every data member carrying the value of a field of an SNMP message has associated attributes. These attributes control memory management and indicate whether a value is present. By adding these attributes to all data members, we are able to pass a decoded SNMP message through several stages of a processing pipeline until the message is finally serialized into one of the output formats. The drivers, which produce different output formats, adhere to a common interface, which makes the implementation extensible. The overall data flow within snmpdump is shown in Figure l. 3) Filtering. The filter module of snmpdump is responsible to filter out message fields that should be suppressed, for instance because specific sensitive data must be removed. The message fields that should be suppressed are selected using a regular expression and the suppression essentially changes the attributes of the selected message fields. As a safety measure, the data stored in filtered message fields is cleared or set to some standard "null" value, just in case some other code forgets to check the attributes when accessing message fields. 4) Conversion. The format of the payload of SNMP messages changed when the second version of SNMP was introduced. In particular, the format of unconfirmed traps was changed and harmonized. The coexistence specification [12] defines a conversion procedure, which allows traps in the old format to be translated into the new format and back. The conversion module implements this conversion procedure in order to provide a uniform initerface. Note that the conversion module can be bypassed if no conversion is desirable. If conversion has been performed, it is necessary to call the filter module again since the conversion might have filled message fields with values, which were not present before.
5) Anonymization. The anonymization module is respon sible for anonymizing message fields It makes use of a reusable anonymization library called 1libanon [13] . The library provides anonymization functions for standard data types such as signed / unsigned integers and octet strings as well as specific functions for MAC addresses or IP addresses. The anonymization functions support a lexicographic-orderpreserving mode in order to preserve SNMP's lexicographicorder property of instance identifiers. A more detailed description of prefix-and lexicographic-order-preserving IP address anonymization can be found in [13] .
In order to select the anonymization function for a given message field, it is necessary to have some context information, such as the object descriptor or the object's type name. The anonymization module therefore looks up data definitions by calling the 1 ibsrmi library, an embeddable MIB parser library. Note that these lookups are only performed if anonymization has been requested and the values in question are actually present. The selection of the anonymization function to apply for a given object or a given data type is runtime configurable.
6) Flow Identification. Large traces, which may contain interactions of several managers with hundreds of agents, usually have to be broken into more manageable pieces. A natural choice is to split a combined trace into several traces, each one representing a message flow. An SNMP message flow is defined as all messages between a source and destination address pair which belong to a command generator (CG) / command responder (CR) relationship or a notification originator (NO) / notification receiver (NR) relationship. The above definition deliberately does not consider port numbers. The reasons are twofold: First, most managed devices include just a single SNMP agent. Even if multiple agents are present, either subagent protocols or proxy mechanisms are usually used to hide this. Even if a device has multiple totally independent SNMP agents, we still consider the device a single logically managed device. Second, many managing systems make heavy use of dynamically allocated port numbers which can change frequently and thus would cause lots of unrelated flows to be generated, even though all the flows are coming from a single management station.
The implementation of the flow identification module re quires to deal with reordered messages and to associate responses (and reports) to prior requests since responses do not indicate whether they are sent in response to a notification or a data retrieval operation. Trace lOStl was collected at a regional network provider network. The network utilizes many wireless point-to-point links to interconnect research institutions, government institutions and commercial organizations.
Trace 106tOl was collected on the main network management server of a national research network. Note that there are additional systems generating SNMP traffic in this network and thus the trace only describes the traffic generated by a single management system. Finally, trace 112t01 was collected at a point of presence of another national research network.
Network traffic was captured using tcpdump and stored in pcap format. In some cases, we could capture other management traffic (e.g. SYSLOG) in addition to SNMP traffic. We plan to analyze these traces in the future and relate the results to the SNMP analysis we are working on at the moment.
V. ANALYSIS The purpose of this section is to present some initial analysis results, more traces must be collected and additional analysis methods and scripts must be developed before more comprehensive conclusions on SNMP usage can be drawn. Still it is possible to present some interesting first results. The traces 10tO2, 102t01, and 103tO2 contain a Set operations but due to the small number, they do not play a significant role in the overall traffic mix. A closer look at trace 101t02 revealed that all recorded Set operations were trying to modify the sysLocation scalar with a value of type Integer32, which obviously leads to an error response due to a type mismatch, if authentication and access control would have been successful. In trace 102tOl, we observe Set requests to two proprietary MIB modules, which allow to copy configuration files to/from a device. In trace 103tO2, we found that Set operations are used to trigger the download of a VLAN membership policy specification.
A. General Characterization
Table III also reveals that trace 104t0O contains significantly more requests than responses. One possible explanation could be packet loss. Upon further investigation and discussion with the network operators, we learned, however, that the day the traces were collected some systems were switched off for maintenance purposes. (max-reps) and the non-repeaters (non-reps) parameters of the GetBulk operations. The first interesting observation is that none of the GetBulk operation used non-repeaters.
In traces lOltO5 and 102t0l, almost 100% of the GetBulk requests use 10 max-reps. The GetBulk requests in trace 10401 always use 1000 max-reps while the requests in trace 106tO1 always use the 12 max-reps.
C. Response Size Distribution Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of the sizes of the response messages. The vast majority of the response messages are about 100 bytes long for traces that do not include the GetBulk operation. The corresponding requests are usually even smaller since they do not contain any values.
As we will see later, most of the objects retrieved are actually simple numbers whose encoding is relatively compact. The traffic is not evenly distributed across the flows. In fact, all traces have a relatively small number of dominating flows. Figure 3 shows the number of messages per minute and the number of bytes per minute exchanged in the various flows of trace 101t02. The flows were sorted by descending number of messages per minute.
The solid curve in Figure 3 shows that there are some high volume flows with up to 300 messages per minutes (mpm) but also many flows with less than 20 messages per minutes. The strong correlation between the number of requests and the bandwidth consumed surely cannot be expected for flows that make heavy usage of the GetBulk operation. From The computation of the traffic flows for trace 103tO2 revealed that there is one very high intensity flow, which contains 94.3% of all messages in this trace. Figure 5 shows the traffic intensity of the flows in logarithmic scale. This [14] . Another interesting plot which also includes a significant number of NO/NR flows is shown in Figure 8 . Management interface m3 acts solely as a notification receiver while management interface ml acts as both command generator and notification receiver. The management interface mO acts as a pure commands generator. The single dark dot and the dark coloring of mTO indicates that the traffic is dominated by a single flow between TnO and the dark managed element. As mentioned above, we know that all management interfaces in trace 101t02 belong to a single multi-homed machine. Figure 7 where we again see a rather simple low volume setup around management interface Trnl plus a rather complex setup around The flow topology shown in Figure 9 belongs to trace 103tO2 and looks kind of surprising. We see as many as 18
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-' "103tO2-snmp-mpm .data" -l ''103tO2-snmp-bpm.data" X;X;X; ;X;XXf A further analysis of the flows reveals that the CRs retrieve information about printer supplies from the network element, which therefore likely is a somewhat important printer in the faculty network. We assume that the printer supply monitoring application is running on systems which get IP addresses assigned dynamically. In Figure 9 , we also see two notification receiver interfaces and there seem to be three nodes sending notifications to both notification receiver interfaces. The high volume time-filter traffic is exchanged between management interface ri2 and the dark dot. While many flows show a quite regular traffic intensity, it is important to note that this is not generally true. Figure 10 shows the time series for one of the highest volume flows in trace 106tO. While the regular periodic coomponent can easily be identified, we also see significant variations. We know that the network had three major events (fibre cuts, power outages) during the measurement period. Such events clearly affect the observed monitoring traffic. It is also interesting to see that the average polling intensity seems to have changed after almost five days.
To our surprise, we found that many notification flows also carry periodic traffic however typically at a much lower rate. Devices seem to regularly report device states (e.g., states (e.g., PIM routing losses) that are not fixed. Figure II shows the traffic intensity of a notification flow which at the beginning has a constant flow of one notification per minute. After three days, however, significantly more notifications are generated and then the flow terminates. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the notification details. All we know is that this device is an optical fibre system and that there were fibre cuts during the data collection period.
We further investigated how typical manager-agent interactions look like. Figure 12 shows 30 seconds of GetNext interactions for a specific CR in trace 102tOl. G. Data Types Table VI shows the data types seen in response messages. The column exc lists the number of exceptions that have been seen. Response messages that include a nul type are SNMP error messages (actually all noSuchNam1e errors). However, there are also some traces where error responses contain data, especially in trace lOStOl. A closer inspection revealed that this trace contains many Get requests that have values in the varbind list and it seems these requests are simply echoed back when an operation fails, without removing varbind values. We also noted that almost all requests in trace lOStOl use 0 as the request identifier -something rather dubious. We checked the other traces and found that some SNMP stacks use random request identifier while others simply increment the request identifier, which means they are predictable. [3] - [5] , [7] , [8] [16] . This work is complementary as it aims at providing empirical data about the usage of SNMP in production network. This data is needed to select realistic scenarios and models for evaluating SNMP performance. Perhaps some of the papers mentioned above need to be revisited once we better understand how SNMP is used in production networks.
A static (compile time) analysis of MIB module definitions is reported in [17] . One conclusion was that MIB modules contain a large number of integral data types. So far, our traces also show a strong usage of integral types. The analysis in [17] also showed that advanced router vendors prefer these days to define 64-bit counters and it seems that 64-bit counters are also preferred in some of the traces. The compiler backend described in [17] makes certain assumptions about the behavior of SNMP implementations, for example to predict likely encoding sizes. The work reported in this paper helps to provide a basis for these assumptions.
The anonymization performed by the snmpdump tool is similar to the approach described in [18] in the sense that we deal with the anonymization of complete payloads. However, in contrast to [18] , our tool is specialized to deal with SNMP traffic and we are not interested to regenerate frames. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

